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INTRODUCTION
The deepening of the global financial crisis in the autumn of
2008 was accompanied by a drastic decline in global risk
appetite combined with a general, substantial increase in
credit risk premia. Consequently, the Hungarian sovereign
credit spread – the compensation which investors expect to
receive in exchange for assuming the credit risk associated
with Hungary – has also been higher in recent months than
in previous periods. However, given that the various prices
indicating new developments in the Hungarian sovereign
credit spread have, to a certain degree, departed from one
another during the period under review, defining the actual
value of the Hungarian credit spread is currently a challenge
in its own right. Along with identifying the precise changes
that the credit spread has been subject to, another important
issue is to determine the extent to which the growth in the
spread can be attributed to a global decline in risk appetite –
which equally affected all emerging markets – and to unique,
country-specific factors. This article is intended to answer
these questions.
The first part of the paper presents the alternative price
data that capture developments in the Hungarian sovereign
credit risk spread; the Hungarian sovereign foreign
currency bond spread; and the Hungarian sovereign CDS –
credit default swap – spread. Because of their relative
unfamiliarity and ostensible complexity, we provide a
detailed account of the characteristics of credit derivatives
and CDS contracts, as well as the functioning of the CDS
market in general, and the Hungarian sovereign CDS
market in particular. The next section contains a brief
description of the findings based on which the CDS market,
rather than the Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bond
market, should be considered the most reliable measure of
the Hungarian sovereign credit spread. The last section of
the paper proceeds to identify the global and country-
specific factors which have contributed to the changes in
the Hungarian credit spread in recent months.
MEASURING THE SOVEREIGN CREDIT
RISK OF HUNGARY
Several sources are available to provide information on
developments affecting Hungarian sovereign credit risk. For
example, we can monitor the assessment of major
international credit rating agencies (Moody’s, S&P, Fitch,
etc.) of Hungary’s credit rating as well as their revisions of
Hungary’s rating. While these ratings are typically reliable
indicators of changes in the credit risk associated with a
country in the long run, the credit ratings of individual rating
agencies may differ from one another in the short term, and
the decision to upgrade or downgrade a certain country often
lags behind market perceptions. For this reason, in order to
analyse the changes in Hungary’s sovereign credit risk with
higher frequency – for example, on a daily basis – we must
seek a different source of information. The accuracy of the
information can also be improved by relying on price data
As the CDS market has been the primary market for the price discovery of Hungarian sovereign credit risk in recent years, we
can gain the most reliable information about Hungarian sovereign credit risk premia by analysing the price of Hungarian CDS
contracts, in other words, the CDS spread. Credit default swaps are contractual agreements between two parties, whereby one
party assumes the credit risk associated with a bond held by another party by undertaking to pay the other party the nominal
value of the bond in the case that the issuer of the bond defaults, in exchange for which it receives a series of periodic payments
from the other party during the term of the contract. The turnover and outstanding amount of CDS contracts related to
Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bonds exceed the secondary market turnover and outstanding stock of Hungarian foreign
currency bonds. Last autumn, Hungary was hit particularly hard by the significant decline in risk appetite observed in relation
to emerging markets, and in October 2008 both the level and the relative international position of the Hungarian sovereign
credit risk spread deteriorated substantially. Raising the key policy rate in October 2008, combined with the IMF credit facility,
contributed largely to stopping the profound loss of confidence in Hungarian investment opportunities. The substantial decline
in Hungarian sovereign CDS spreads observed in March-May 2009 can be almost entirely attributed to improving global risk
appetite.
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financial crisisobtained from financial markets, which reflect the actual
financial investments of market agents.
One possible solution is to quantify the exact portion of the
yield on Hungarian foreign currency bonds, which investors
expect to receive in exchange for assuming the credit risk
associated with the Hungarian government. If investors’
perception of Hungary’s sovereign credit risk changes, the
credit spread they expect to receive will increase or decrease
accordingly. The credit spread on a euro-denominated
Hungarian foreign currency bond can be estimated by
deducting from its yield the yield of a corresponding risk-
free bond, the other parameters (maturity, denomination,
interest rate, secondary market liquidity, etc.) of which are
completely identical with the first bond. Since all parameters
of the two bonds – other than credit risk – are identical, we
can assume that their yields contain the same amount of
other (interest rate, liquidity, exchange rate, reinvestment,
etc.) risk premium, and thus any difference between the two
yields should purely reflect the credit spread associated with
the Hungarian foreign exchange bond. In line with the
prevailing market practice, for the purposes of this paper we
used the euro-denominated German government bond yield
to approximate the value of the risk-free euro yield.
However, our estimate of the yield spread on Hungarian
foreign currency bonds may not be entirely accurate, due to
the following reasons: one, even German government bonds
are not completely risk-free; two, Hungarian and German
foreign currency bonds cannot have precisely identical
parameters; three, the liquidity of the Hungarian foreign
currency market is much lower than that of the German
government bond market. Consequently, Hungarian foreign
currency bond yields should definitely contain a higher
liquidity premium. Nevertheless, some of these
imperfections can be eliminated, and empirical experiences
suggest that the overall distortion they create is not as
significant as to render analyses based on the thus estimated
yield spreads unreliable.
Thanks to the development of financial markets, by the
middle of the 2000s an alternative source of determining the
price of Hungarian sovereign credit risk emerged: the price
of credit default swap (CDS) deals, a derivative product used
explicitly for the pricing and transferring of credit risk.
CDS CONTRACTS AND THE HUNGARIAN
SOVEREIGN CDS MARKET
Considering their success and steady development, credit
derivative products are by far the most prominent financial
innovation of the last decade. A common feature of these
financial contracts is that they are used to transfer the credit
risks associated with bonds or loans from one party to
another without transferring any other risks (such as
exchange rate, interest rate, reinvestment risks, etc.)
associated with these loans or bonds. The borrower or the
issuer of the bond does not typically participate in the deal,
which is made between two counterparties independently of
the borrower or issuer.
Credit default swap (CDS) contracts constitute the basis for
credit derivative markets. According to the semi-annual
survey conducted by BIS in the derivative market (2008) and
to the data provided by ISDA (2008), at the end of 2007 the
total nominal value of outstanding CDS contracts reached
USD 30 trillion. Credit default swaps are contractual
agreements made between two parties for a pre-determined
term, in order to transfer the credit risk associated with a
third party (the entity that issued the bond or the borrower,
hereinafter the reference entity) from one party to the other.
The term CDS refers to this credit risk swap. However, when
we look at the functioning of these contracts and the pattern
of the related cash flow, we find that CDS transactions are in
fact much closer to insurance or option deals in content than
to traditional swap transactions.
1
According to market terminology, the buyer of the CDS buys
protection, while the seller of the CDS is obligated to
compensate the protection buyer by paying the nominal value
of the bond or the loan if the reference entity defaults. The
protection buyer makes a series of periodic payments to the
protection seller, and does not realise a profit on the deal
unless the reference entity defaults or the market’s collective
assessment of the credit rating of the reference entity
deteriorates during the term of the CDS. By contrast, the
protection seller receives periodic payments, and profits from
the deal if no default takes place during the term of the CDS,
or the credit rating of the reference entity improves. The
CDS buyer or seller can take advantage of the deterioration
or improvement of the reference entity’s credit rating if –
rather than locking in their positions until maturity – they
enter into an offsetting contract to close the deal as soon as
the prevailing fees change to their advantage. In this case, the
profit they realise will be the difference between the fees
collected on the two opposing deals.
The regularly paid fee is commonly known as the CDS spread
in international terminology. The term ‘spread’ usually refers
to a type of interest rate margin or interest rate premium. On
the one hand, the premium paid regularly under CDS
contracts is called a spread because its amount is determined
in basis points. The regularly paid premium is the product of
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1 See Csávás–Varga–Balogh (2007) for details on the characteristic features and classification of traditional swap transactions.this amount defined in basis points and the total nominal
value of the underlying bonds or loans of the CDS contract
between the parties. On the other hand, we may look at the
regularly paid premium as a portion of the regular interest
income paid by the reference entity to the party holding the
bond or loan instrument, which the latter passes on to the
protection seller in exchange for the seller’s assumption of
the credit risk associated with the reference entity. Thus, in
this sense, the regularly paid premium is a portion of the
received interest payable in exchange for taking on credit
exposure (credit risk premium).
There are two major groups of driving forces behind
participation in CDS contracts (and essentially in any other
credit derivative transaction). First, by means of CDS deals
the credit risk associated with the holding of loan or bond
portfolios can be reduced or completely eliminated. Second,
the application of credit derivatives allows the investor to
take up and switch positions easily and flexibly, betting on
positive or negative future changes in the creditworthiness of
an economic agent. To achieve this latter goal, it is not even
necessary for the investor taking up a position in the credit
derivative market to have any exposure vis-à-vis the specific
economic agent. Speculating on changes in an entity’s
creditworthiness and taking up positions accordingly has
substantially contributed to the surge in credit derivatives in
recent years, as credit derivatives allow investors to take
such positions with an ease and flexibility that would not be
possible by means of the underlying loan or bond
instruments alone.
Based on the sector of reference entities, global CDS
markets can be divided into two major groups: CDS
markets linked to corporate bonds (including bank-issued
bonds) and sovereign bonds. CDS deals with underlying
corporate bonds are by far the more dominant of the two.
Even though recent years have seen a considerable turnover
growth in sovereign CDS deals – as has been the case in the
global market overall – data provided by the large credit
derivative brokers which we interviewed indicate that their
market share is only around 5-6%, and the nominal value of
outstanding sovereign CDS contracts was probably around
USD 1.5-1.8 trillion at the end of 2007. CDS contracts with
the underlying foreign currency bonds of emerging
countries accounted for the vast majority of sovereign CDS
turnover, representing over 90%.
Most features of sovereign CDS deals are identical with
those of corporate bonds except, naturally, that under a
sovereign CDS contract it is a country’s credit risk that is
transferred between market participants. A sovereign CDS
contract may have any maturity. However, the most
favourable terms are between 1 and 10 years, of which the
5-year-term tends to be the most liquid according to market
participants. In case of a default event on the part of the
specific sovereign reference entity (typically a failure to pay,
debt restructuring or moratorium), the protection buyer
delivers to the protection seller any bond under the terms of
the contract issued by the reference entity in the face value
equal to the nominal value specified in the CDS, in return
for which the protection seller pays the buyer the par value
of the bond. Rather than physically delivering the bonds
affected by the default event, using a cash settlement for the
conclusion of CDS contracts has become an increasingly
popular practice in sovereign CDS markets. In this case, the
protection buyer does not have to deliver the bonds;
instead, the protection seller pays the buyer the difference
between the par value and the post-default market value of
the affected bonds. Under the terms of sovereign CDS
contracts, in the case of a default event, government bonds
issued by the specific sovereign can be generally delivered
denominated in any accepted foreign currency listed in the
ISDA Master Agreement (euro, US dollar, pound sterling,
Japanese yen, Swiss franc, and Canadian dollar). In
sovereign CDS trades, the CDS spread is also quoted as an
annual premium payable by the protection buyer, but as is
the case in other CDS markets, it is typically paid in
quarterly instalments, and the nominal amount of the
payment is the specific par value multiplied by the specific
portion of the CDS spread computed for the length of the
given quarter (length of the quarter in days/360).
Under Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts, the counterparties
can transfer the credit risks of foreign currency bonds issued by
the Hungarian government denominated in any standard,
accepted foreign currency. Reliable information regarding the
Hungarian sovereign CDS market is scarce. Similarly to other
credit derivatives markets, the Hungarian sovereign CDS
market is a typical OTC (over-the-counter, unregulated)
market where the scope of market participants and their
trading motives are hard to grasp. There are no real dealers;
trading takes place through credit derivative brokers, who are
responsible for pairing up the anonymous, nevertheless
binding bids of market participants, typically submitted by
electronic mail. The majority of credit derivative brokers are
based in London or New York. According to the triennial BIS
survey on global foreign currency and derivatives market
activity (2007) and based on the information provided by
domestic credit institutions, Hungarian market participants do
not enter into Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts. Active
market participants include global investment banks, hedge
funds and other non-resident fund managers, typically
motivated by the possibility of taking flexible positions, which
allows them to take advantage of any changes in the credit risk
premium of the Hungarian government. Trading is based on
the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement, a standard form
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refer to nominal values of EUR 5-10 million. In line with
global trends, contracts with a 5-year maturity are the most
liquid in the Hungarian sovereign CDS market as well.
According to the information provided by credit derivative
brokers, the Hungarian sovereign CDS market achieved an
adequate level of liquidity around the end of 2005 and early
2006, which marked the beginning of a gradual turnover
growth; particularly remarkable liquidity growth was observed
from early 2008.
Based on the survey we conducted in 2008 with the
participation of the largest global credit derivative brokers
(see Varga, 2008), the Hungarian sovereign CDS market
has low liquidity compared to the average liquidity of credit
derivatives markets. In terms of the number of quotes it is
in the lowest quarter of sovereign CDS markets.
Nevertheless,  in 2008 brokers typically received 30-40
binding price quotes on a daily basis from an average of ten
banks, accounting for 1-3% of all sovereign CDS quotes,
while the daily turnover of actual trades is estimated to be
at least EUR 10-20 million. While these values significantly
fall behind the turnover of the most liquid CDS markets,
the Hungarian sovereign CDS market is considerably more
liquid than the secondary market of the underlying
Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bonds, where no
daily trades are performed according to market
participants. Based on our estimate, the outstanding stock of
Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts at the end of 2007
amounted to around USD 10-30 billion or around EUR 7-20
billion. Based on the CDS stock data published following
our survey
2 by the clearing house Depository Trust &
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) at the end of October 2008,
the above estimate – particularly its upper limit – was in the
correct range. According to the information provided by
DTCC, on 31 October 2008 the gross outstanding stock of
Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts amounted to nearly
USD 33 billion, or over EUR 25 billion. Comparing these
values to USD 21 billion – the total amount outstanding of
foreign currency bonds issued by the Hungarian
government as of the end of 2007 – it is evident that despite
its daily turnover falling far short of the average turnover of
the more liquid credit derivatives markets, the Hungarian
sovereign CDS market should still be considered a
significant market from the perspective of pricing
Hungarian sovereign credit risk.
PRIMARY MARKET OF THE PRICE
DISCOVERY OF HUNGARY’S SOVEREIGN
CREDIT RISK
As the previous section indicated, the price of Hungary’s
sovereign credit risk can be defined both as the Hungarian
sovereign foreign currency bond yield spread over the
corresponding risk-free bond yields, or as the CDS spread. If
these two prices are the same, we can rely equally on either
one and draw the same conclusion, in other words, the price
discovery that took place in two different markets will not
pose a problem. If the opposite is true, i.e. the two prices are
not identical, in order to achieve a reliable analysis, as a first
step we need to decide which price provides more – as well
as more accurate – information about the changes in the
credit spread.
Until the final quarter of 2007, the two five-year Hungarian
sovereign credit spreads moved together; fluctuating around
20-30 basis points (see Chart 1). However, from the end of
2007 they deviated from one another several times. Initially,
in 2008 the CDS spread was typically higher than the foreign
currency bond yield spread, but at the end of 2008 they
reversed directions. While both the CDS spread and the bond
yield spread started to soar, the difference between them
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Chart 1
Developments in the five-year Hungarian CDS
















































































































































Five-year Hungarian foreign currency bond yield spread
Five-year Hungarian CDS spread
Source: Datastream, Bloomberg, own calculations.
2 http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php.
3 On the computation of five-year Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bond yield spreads, see Varga (2008). In view of the fact that credit spreads were subject to a
significant increase in the autumn of 2008 even in countries previously considered risk-free – including Germany – we deviated from the method applied for the
purposes of that study in that we deducted the prevailing German CDS spread from the euro-denominated benchmark German government bond yield in order to
calculate the risk-free yield.increased significantly as well, at times reaching or even
exceeding 200 basis points, and in any case, staying
consistently over 100 basis points. Cointegration analyses
examining the relationship between the two time series over
different periods arrived at similar conclusions.
4 They
confirm that while the two time series cointegrate in the long
run, they may temporarily deviate from one another due to
microstructural factors (for example, the different liquidity
situation of the two markets, the small proportion of
participants that are active in both markets, transaction costs,
which are capable of persistently preventing market arbitrage
forces from coming into effect). Thus, the Hungarian CDS
spread and the foreign currency bond yield spread may
contain strongly conflicting information about the changes in
the credit spread in different periods, and therefore we need
to decide which of the two has the most reliable information
content.
In the case of financial markets, the concept of market
effectiveness can be used to determine how relevant and
reliable the information content of market pricing is. To put
it simply, the more available information is captured in the
prices of a market, the faster, the more effective the given
market should be. On the other hand, the more liquid a
financial market is, the information is captured in the prices
to a greater extent and faster. Consequently, of two markets
sharing the same parameters, the more liquid one is probably
more effective. Despite the lack of precisely verifiable data,
we have suggested before that according to information
obtained from market participants, the Hungarian sovereign
CDS market is more liquid than the secondary market of
Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bond market. Based
on this, the CDS market is probably the more effective
market of the two, in other words, the CDS spreads contain
more relevant information about the developments in the
Hungarian sovereign credit risk.
Furthermore, effective markets tend to be the first to capture
changes in prices, while price changes in the less effective,
albeit similar markets, will lag behind. This further supports
our assumption that the CDS market is more effective than
the foreign currency bond market. Indeed, as Chart 1 clearly
indicates, in recent years the five-year foreign currency bond
yield spread has typically adjusted to changes in the five-year
CDS spread with a lag. To put it differently: Chart 1 suggests
that the CDS market, rather than the foreign currency bond
market, is the primary market where the price discovery of
the Hungarian sovereign credit spread takes place, as new
information regarding the credit spread is first captured in
the CDS spreads.
However, anecdotal information obtained from market
participants and the correlation suggested by the chart should
not be considered irrefutable evidence. Thus, as it is suitable
in the case of cointegrating time series, we have conducted a
number of error correction analyses for the purpose of
identifying the primary market of price discovery.
5 Based on
the results, for the periods of both 2006–2008 and 2008–
2009 the CDS market was undoubtedly the primary market of
the price discovery of the Hungarian sovereign credit spread,
while the foreign currency bond market did not prove to be
an effective market, in that the foreign currency band yield
spread merely adjusted to changes in CDS spreads. As we
have seen, an analysis of Hungarian CDS spreads can provide
the most accurate information about the Hungarian
sovereign credit spread. This result characterises countries
other than Hungary as well: in the majority of emerging
countries examined in 2008 by Varga (2008), the CDS
market, rather than the foreign currency bond market, was
the leader in the price discovery process of the sovereign
credit spread. Consequently, including the period that has
elapsed in 2009 to date, the CDS spread was a more reliable
measure of the actual level of the sovereign credit spread,
which also implies that the foreign currency band yield
spread – which exceeds the CDS spread by an average of 100-
200 basis points according to Chart 1 – should not be
considered realistic as a credit spread. Nevertheless, we
cannot conclude that the level of Hungarian sovereign
foreign currency bond yields is unjustified from an economic
perspective. Indeed, the fact that the foreign currency bond
yield spread has been persistently higher than the CDS spread
probably reflects a significant increase in the level of the
liquidity premium on Hungarian foreign currency bonds
since late October 2008. As we have stated above, the
method we applied to estimate the credit spread of foreign
currency bond yields cannot separate the liquidity premium
from the foreign currency bond yield spread.
DEVELOPMENTS IN HUNGARIAN
SOVEREIGN CDS SPREADS IN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
As Chart 1 indicates, the CDS spread, a reliable measure of
the Hungarian sovereign credit spread, increased slightly in
March-April 2008, and significantly in the autumn of 2008.
In the rest of this paper, our primary goal is to assess the
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4The exact method and the results of the periods preceding 2008 are presented in Varga (2008), while the results of the period between 2008 and 2009 are included
in the Annex.
5The exact method and the results of the periods preceding 2008 are presented in Varga (2008), while the results of the period between 2008 and 2009 are included
in the Annex.extent to which the above changes in the Hungarian credit
spread can be attributed to a substantial, global decline in risk
appetite observed in the second half of 2008 – i.e. a general
increase in global credit spreads – and the extent to which
country-specific factors contributed to these developments.
To answer this question, we conducted a comparative
analysis of the five-year Hungarian sovereign CDS spreads
versus CDS spreads observed in different other countries in
the period of January 2007 and May 2009, taking into
account the credit ratings of the sample countries as well.
Besides Hungary, we used the 5-year CDS spreads and the
average credit rating – the average rating of Moody’s and
S&P – of 14 additional emerging countries
6 relevant from the
perspective of the relative development of the Hungarian
economy and Hungarian financial markets for our
calculations.
Our goal was to grasp, at each point in time across the sample
period, the common information we can gain from the
relationship between the CDS spread and credit ratings of
different emerging countries, and examine how the specific
values of Hungary compare to that common information. In
order to achieve this – in the same way as illustrated by the
three randomly selected days on Chart 2 – we estimated a
regression for each day of the sample period between the
five-year CDS spreads and the credit ratings of the emerging
countries in our sample.
7
The slope of the daily regression lines was positive across the
sample period (Chart 3).
8 This means that the five-year
sovereign CDS spread levels of the emerging countries in our
sample were broadly consistent with the credit rating of
individual countries, as the expected CDS spread of lower-
rated countries is wider than that of countries with a better
credit rating. The slope of the regression lines remained
steady until the end of 2007; however, from the end of 2007
the slope began to flatten and the constant term of the
regressions began to rise. Since – in consideration of the non-
linear relationship between credit quality and the expected
credit spread – we ran the regression on the logarithm of
CDS spreads, this change indicates an overall, significant
widening of credit spreads across all credit rating categories
from the end of 2007, which further escalated in the autumn
of 2008.
As regards Hungary, based on the parameters of the daily
regressions between the credit ratings and five-year CDS
spreads of emerging countries, we estimated what would
have been the value of the five-year Hungarian sovereign
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Chart 2
Credit ratings and five-year CDS spreads of
emerging countries 














































































Source: Datastream, own calculations.
Chart 3
Daily changes of the slope and the constant term of
the linear regression between the credit ratings and

















































































































































































































































































Slope Constant term (right-hand scale)
Source: Own calculations.
6 Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Republic of South Africa, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey and Ukraine.
7 For a more detailed description of the method, see Varga (2008). While regression analysis is in theory used to examine the relationship between two ratio variables,
general market experience suggests a linear relationship between the logarithms of credit spreads and the credit ratings measured on an ordinal scale. We used the
logarithm of credit spreads because according to general market experience, the change in credit spreads that follows the deterioration of the credit rating between
categories is usually not linear but exponential, as market participants demand increasing expansion in risk premia when credit quality declines, especially as the
credit rating approaches non-investment grade categories.
8 On 13 March 2008 the slope of the estimated regression line reached 0.12, its flattest position in the sample period, however, with a p value of 0.009 even this figure
implies a statistically significant positive slope at all standard significance levels.CDS spread on each day of the sample period (see Chart 4).
While the estimated and actual values of the CDS spreads
broadly cointegrated during the sample period, from 2007
we could identify three periods when the actual value of the
CDS spread exceeded – by more than 50 basis points – the
regression line between the credit ratings and five-year CDS
spreads of emerging countries. Thus in these periods (in
March 2008, in October 2008 and starting from March
2009) the value of the Hungarian sovereign CDS spread was
not consistent with the correlation we observed between the
sovereign credit ratings and the level of sovereign CDS
spreads across the group of emerging countries.
The increase of the Hungarian sovereign CDS spread to 150
basis points in March 2008 was justified by the overall surge
observed in the CDS spreads of emerging countries across all
credit rating categories. However, exceeding this value of
150 basis points – which was justified by global developments
– by around 60 basis points, the Hungarian sovereign CDS
spread increased to 210 basis points. Thus, this 60-basis-
point increase should be considered a country-specific factor,
which cannot be attributed to the general growth of credit
spreads observed in global markets. Although this country-
specific growth in March 2008 was neither significant nor
lasting, it was rather exceptional because, in addition to
fundamental reasons (i.e. investors’ more negative
perceptions about the credit risk of Hungary than would have
been justified by the official assessment of credit rating
agencies) technical factors contributed to it as well, as market
participants reported a significant decline in the liquidity
status of the secondary market of forint government
securities and an increase in liquidity premia during the same
period.
9
Parallel to the gradually decreasing Hungarian sovereign
CDS spread, the difference declined as well from April 2008,
but even until late August it was unable to drop below 20
basis points for a longer period of time. This suggests that
even after March 2008 investors had a slightly worse
perception of Hungary’s credit risk than the average of other
emerging countries with similar credit rating. This
assumption is supported by the fact that the growth of the
Hungarian CDS spread following the default of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 surpassed the level justified by
the general, global growths of CDS spreads, and the
difference once again reached 50 basis points.
As the credit spread of emerging countries temporarily
decreased after the default of Lehman Brothers, a significant
decline in risk appetite was observed in early October 2008,
indicating that the government and central bank measures
announced in developed markets failed to alleviate investors’
fears in the long run. Considering the average credit rating of
Hungary at the time, until the middle of October global
developments justified growth of the Hungarian CDS spread
up to nearly 500 basis points, which is more than twice as
high as the highest value observed in the past. At that point,
it became apparent that investors’ perceptions of the credit
risk of Hungary was significantly more unfavourable than
their assessment of the credit risk of other emerging
countries. Indeed, on 16 October 2008 the Hungarian
sovereign CDS spread surpassed the regression line between
the credit ratings and five-year CDS spreads of emerging
countries by 150 basis points, a historical high. In conclusion,
the significant decline in risk appetite triggered by the
financial crisis, which affected all emerging markets, was
particularly severe for Hungary, because the perceptions of
market participants of Hungary’s credit risk was significantly
poorer – by several rating categories – than its prevailing
average credit rating. The emergency interest rate increase on
22 October 2008 followed by the announcement of the IMF
credit facility agreement on 26 October largely contributed to
stopping the profound loss of confidence in Hungarian
investments. In the days that followed, parallel to a general
global improvement of credit spreads, the difference between
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9 Indeed, investors who were unable to reduce their Hungarian credit risk exposure because the shrinking liquidity of the domestic government bond market did not
allow them to sell their government bonds to the extent they had wished to suddenly created an immense demand for Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts. As they
were seeking protection with respect to their credit exposure vis-à-vis the Hungarian government, their behaviour triggered an abrupt and substantial increase in the
Hungarian CDS spread. For more details see Varga (2008).
Chart 4
Deviation of the five-year Hungarian CDS spread
from the regression line between the credit ratings




























































































































































































































Five-year Hungarian CDS spread
Estimated five-year Hungarian CDS spread
Difference (right-hand scale)
Basis points
Source: Datastream, own calculations.the actual and the estimated Hungarian CDS spreads
dropped to nearly zero from the previously observed
historical high.
However, the decline of the Hungarian sovereign CDS
spread proved to be temporary: as early as the middle of
November 2008 its growth surpassed, once again, the extent
justified by the regression line between the credit ratings and
five-year CDS spreads of emerging countries. Although the
difference, which exceeded 50 basis points again, returned
close to zero by the end of November, this time the
narrowing reflected the downgrading of Hungary’s credit
rating that was first announced by Moody’s and then by S&P
in November, rather than new developments that improved
Hungary’s risk perception. While the difference widened
again in the first few days of December, between late
November 2008 and late February 2009 the value of the
Hungarian CDS spread was broadly consistent with the
global changes in credit spreads. In fact, as evidenced by the
negative difference between the actual and estimated CDS
spreads, in January 2009 investors’ perceptions regarding
Hungary’s credit risk was more positive than the average
credit rating of the country at the time.
These positive developments came to a halt in March 2009,
when – reflecting a substantial weakening of the forint
exchange rate – the Hungarian sovereign CDS spread
significantly surpassed the level justified by global
developments once again. Fluctuating around 500 basis
points, at the end of March the Hungarian CDS spread
exceeded the level warranted by Hungary’s prevailing credit
rating by nearly 100 basis points. Again, the widening of the
gap was halted by Moody’s and S&P’s announcement in the
last days of March about further downgrading Hungary’s
credit rating, each by one category. However, contrary to
November 2008, the gap between the actual and estimated
Hungarian CDS spreads did not narrow to close to zero in
the wake of the downgrades; in fact it continued to fluctuate
at around 50 basis points until the end of May 2009 (the end
of the sample period). Thus, the substantial decline in
Hungarian sovereign CDS spreads that exceeded 300 basis
points in the period of March-May 2009 can be almost
entirely attributed to improving global risk appetite, rather
than an improvement in Hungary’s relative global credit risk
position.
CONCLUSIONS
The price of Hungary’s sovereign credit risk can be defined
both as the Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bond yield
spread over the corresponding risk-free bond yields, or as the
price of Hungarian sovereign CDS contracts, the CDS
spread. Credit default swaps are contractual agreements
made between two parties for a pre-determined term to
transfer the credit risk associated with the issuer of a bond.
During the term of the CDS contract the party transferring
the credit risk pays the protection seller a series of periodic
payments, commonly known as the CDS spread. If the
reference entity defaults, the protection seller will pay the
protection buyer the nominal value of the bond. The
turnover and outstanding amount of the CDS contracts
related to Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bonds
exceed the secondary market turnover and outstanding stock
of Hungarian foreign currency bonds.
In recent years, the CDS market was undoubtedly the
primary market of the price discovery of the Hungarian
sovereign credit spread, while the foreign currency bond
market did not prove to be an effective market, in that the
foreign currency yield spread merely adjusted to changes in
CDS spreads. Therefore, an analysis of Hungarian CDS
spreads can provide the most accurate information about the
Hungarian sovereign credit spread. In the period of 2009
that has elapsed to date, foreign currency bond yield spreads
have been remarkably high, significantly exceeding the level
of the CDS spread, probably reflecting the increased liquidity
premium on Hungarian foreign currency bonds.
The beginning of October 2008 saw a dramatic increase in
the credit spreads of emerging markets, and at the same time
it became apparent that investors’ perceptions of the credit
risk of Hungary was significantly more unfavourable than
their assessment of the credit risk of other emerging
countries. Indeed, the extent to which the Hungarian
sovereign CDS spread surpassed the level justified by global
developments reached a historical high during this period. In
conclusion, the significant decline in risk appetite triggered
by the financial crisis, which affected all emerging markets,
was particularly severe for Hungary, because the perceptions
of market participants of Hungary’s credit risk was
significantly poorer – by several rating categories – than its
prevailing average credit rating. The emergency interest rate
increase on 22 October 2008 followed by the announcement
of the IMF credit facility agreement on 26 October largely
contributed to stopping the profound loss of confidence in
Hungarian investments. In the days that followed, parallel to
a general global improvement of credit spreads, the relative
disadvantage of Hungary vis-à-vis other emerging countries
diminished. In contrast, the substantial decline in Hungarian
sovereign CDS spreads that exceeded 300 basis points in the
period of March-May 2009 can be almost entirely attributed
to improving global risk appetite, rather than an
improvement in Hungary’s relative global credit risk
position.
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Long-term relationship between the Hungarian
sovereign foreign currency bond market and the
Hungarian sovereign CDS market, and the primary
market of the price discovery of credit risk 
(2008–2009) 
Since the foreign currency bond yield spreads and CDS
spreads subject to our examination tend to follow a unit root
process, we applied a cointegration method to analyse the
long-term relation between the two markets. To determine
the contribution of each market to price discovery, we
estimated the following vector error correction model:
(1a)
(1b)
where  pCDS,t implies the sovereign CDS spread and pCS,t
implies the sovereign foreign currency bond yield spread at
date t. The first, parenthetical expression on the right side of
equations (1a)–(1b) implies the error correction mechanism
through which the sovereign credit spread evolving in the
two markets cointegrate in the long run. Parameters α and β
of the error correction coefficient are the equivalent of the
cointegration parameters.
10 The cointegration and error
correction analysis was performed by using the most liquid,
five-year Hungarian CDS spreads and five-year Hungarian
foreign currency yield spreads for the period of 2 January
2008–15 May 2009 (359 observations).
Based on the results of the Johansen cointegration analysis,
there is evidence of cointegration between the five-year
Hungarian sovereign CDS spread and the five-year
Hungarian sovereign foreign currency bond yield spread in
the sample period (At the 5% significance level, we reject the
null hypothesis suggesting the opposite, as indicated by 
Table 1). On the other hand, based on the test statistics
indicated in the second row, we also reject the null
hypothesis of value [1, –1] for the cointegrating vector. As
noted above, our results indicate that the Hungarian
sovereign CDS spread and foreign currency bond yield
spread cointegrate over the long run. However, the two
prices may deviate from one another over the short term due
to transaction costs, a difference in market liquidity and
additional microstructural factors. Taking also into account
the results suggested by Varga (2008), the cointegration
parameter β exceeded 1 in the sample period 2006–2008,
and dropped below 1 in 2008-2009. This implies that in
2006–2008 the CDS spread, while in 2008-2009 the foreign
currency bond yield spread was more volatile.
As for the parameters of the error correction model, the
value of parameter 2 was significantly positive in the
sample period, while the value of parameter 1 was not
significant. This means that in the sample period it was
primarily in the Hungarian sovereign CDS market where
the price discovery of Hungary’s credit spread took place,
i.e. new information regarding the credit risk of Hungary
was first captured in the CDS spreads. By contrast, the
foreign currency bond market was not an effective market
considering that foreign currency bond yield spreads
merely followed the changes in CDS spreads. If we
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Note: the first row of the table presents Johansen trace test statistics for the five-year Hungarian CDS spread and foreign currency bond yield spread.
The number of lags in the underlying vector auto regression is defined by means of the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The second row displays test
statistics for restrictions on the cointegration parameter β. The third row indicates the estimated value of parameter β. The fourth and fifth rows contain
the estimated values of parameters λ1 and λ2 of equations (1a)–(1b).
For the null hypotheses displayed in the first two rows, the * sign indicates the rejection of the specific null hypothesis, while the * sign in the last two










10 For a more detailed description of the methods see Varga (2008).compare the values of the recently computed parameters to
the results of Varga (2008), we see that this trend in fact
intensified in 2008-2009 relative to the period of
2006–2008.
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